Showing posts with label korean war. Show all posts
Showing posts with label korean war. Show all posts

The Limits of Expertise: Rethinking Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents (Ashgate Studies in Human Factors for Flight Operations) Review

The Limits of Expertise: Rethinking Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents (Ashgate Studies in Human Factors for Flight Operations)
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Air travel has become remarkably safe as a result of advances in equipment systems, operating procedures and training. Each year, flight crews deal skilfully with sub-optimal systems and unexpected situations during the course of around 17 million flights world-wide. Yet airlines operate in a highly competitive market with pressures to deliver unprecedented levels of efficiency, so it is now more important than ever to understand what makes the air transport system vulnerable to failure. Since most aviation accidents have been attributed to deficiencies in the performance of flight crews, it is particularly important to understand what makes pilots vulnerable to error.
In this outstanding and original book, the authors argue that human skill and vulnerability to error are closely linked: errors occur because flight crews are expected to perform tasks at which perfect reliability is not possible - either for humans or machines. The authors show that the presence and interaction of factors contributing to error is probabilistic rather than deterministic. Accidents are rarely caused by a single factor, but rather by the complex interaction of many factors that combine in ways driven largely by chance. The authors argue that small, random variations in the presence and timing of those factors can drastically increase the probability of pilots making errors leading to an accident.
Consequently, it is crucial to understand the nature of vulnerability to error in order to reduce that vulnerability. While it is not always possible to determine exactly why accident crews did what they did, the authors demonstrate that it is possible to understand the types of error to which pilots are vulnerable - and to understand the interplay of various factors contributing to that vulnerability. The central questions posed in this book are: why do highly skilled professional pilots make errors, with consequences that are sometimes fatal to themselves and to their passengers? And how should we understand the role of these errors in accidents in seeking to prevent future accidents? The authors apply scientific knowledge of the nature of skilled performance of humans performing complex tasks to address these questions.
The book reviews the 19 major accidents in US airline operations during the period 1991-2000 in which crew errors played a central role, as defined by the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), based on the NTSB reports and associated documents. While the NTSB must determine the probable cause of each specific accident, the authors take a different approach: would other pilots be vulnerable to making the kinds of errors made by the accident crew and, if so, why? This original approach reveals factors that make all pilots vulnerable to specific types of error in certain situations. In adopting this approach, the authors challenge the assumption that, if expert pilots make errors, this is evidence of their lack of skill, vigilance or conscientiousness. Instead, the authors emphasise the interactions of subtle variations in task demands, incomplete information available to pilots, and the inherent nature of skilled performance. The authors go beyond accident investigation, therefore, to explore the common themes and `deep structure' underlying the accidents.
In addition to the stand-alone accident chapters, the authors provide a statistical summary chapter that extends an earlier study by the NTSB and that reviews accident data for a longer period (1978-2001). In the final chapter, the authors identify the main themes and implications of their study, suggesting specific ways to improve aviation safety. Many issues are raised, including the significance of crew familiarity, crew fatigue, first officer experience levels, unstabilized approaches, plan continuation bias, misleading or absent cues, and monitoring/challenging errors. The authors reframe these airline accidents as `system accidents' resulting from the lack of adequate information provided to crews, the inherent difficulties of assessing ambiguous situations, and the less than extremely conservative guidance given to pilots by the air transport industry.
Overall, this is an excellent and innovative text which reflects the authors' original approach to airline safety. The book is outstanding in its identification of common themes that run deeper than in previous analyses of aviation safety, and the final chapter contains clear, pragmatic guidance to the air transport industry and to researchers. In the final sections of the book, the authors sum up the central challenge faced by the industry in reducing vulnerability to error: pilots should be given more information, better interfaces and clearer decision-making guidance - backed up by prioritising adherence to that guidance over commercial pressures such as on-time performance.
The book will be informative for diverse readers in the air transport industry, including operational staff, researchers, safety analysts, accident investigators, designers of systems and procedures, training providers and students. Given the nature and scope of their study, the authors have focused on the US context, yet their approach could valuably be applied to other parts of the world: a comparable study for Europe, for instance, would be revealing. Their approach could also be extended to other parts of the air transport system, such as air traffic management, where the performance of skilled experts is also implicated in some airline accidents.
The main significance of this book is in its re-framing of the causes of airline accidents: the authors argue that, if we must continue to conceive of airline accidents in terms of deficiency, then that deficiency should be attributed to the overall air transport system. Such an approach can contribute to aviation safety by providing a foundation for improving equipment, training, procedures and organisational policy. In so doing, it is possible to reduce the frequency of `system accidents' and to devise adequate protection against the types of errors to which many, if not all, pilots - as well as many other experts - are vulnerable.


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"The Limits of Expertise" reports a study of the 19 major U.S. airline accidents from 1991-2000 in which the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found crew error to be a causal factor. Each accident is reported in a separate chapter that examines events and crew actions and explores the cognitive processes in play at each step. The majority of all aviation accidents are attributed to human error, but this is often misinterpreted as evidence of lack of skill, vigilance, or conscientiousness of the pilots. Why would highly skilled, well-trained pilots make errors performing tasks they had successfully executed many thousands of times in previous flights? The approach is guided by extensive evidence from cognitive psychology that human skill and error are opposite sides of the same coin. The book examines the ways in which competing task demands, ambiguity and organizational pressures interact with cognitive processes to make all experts vulnerable to characteristic forms of error.The final chapter identifies themes cutting across the accidents, discusses the role of chance, criticizes simplistic concepts of causality of accidents, and suggests ways to reduce vulnerability to these catastrophes. The authors' complementary experience allowed a unique approach to the study: accident investigation with the NTSB, cognitive psychology research both in the lab and in the field, enormous first-hand experience of piloting, and application of aviation psychology in both civil and military operations. This combination allowed the authors to examine and explain the domain-specific aspects of aviation operations and to extend advances in basic research in cognition to complex issues of human performance in the real world. Although "The Limits of Expertise" is directed to aviation operations, the implications are clear for understanding the decision processes, skilled performance and errors of professionals in many domains, including medicine.

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Officers in Flight Suits: The Story of American Air Force Fighter Pilots in the Korean War Review

Officers in Flight Suits: The Story of American Air Force Fighter Pilots in the Korean War
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When the Korean War began in the summer of 1950, the United States Air Force was the youngest branch of the American military, having been created as a service coequal to the Army and Navy less than three years earlier. Although the operational history of the USAF and the experience of many of its officers stretched back into the time when it was a branch of the Army known as the United States Army Air Force, the USAF hadn't yet made its mark as a separate service. The Korean War came at a propitious time, giving the USAF a vehicle in which to shape itself as an institution. The fighter pilots who fought in the Korean War would become the leaders of the new Air Force. Their attitudes toward flying and toward the military in general would come to shape Air Force thinking over the next several decades.
In this book John Sherwood has provided the reader with a close look at the pilots who flew fighters during the Korean War--pilots who, by their skills and attitudes, would establish a style for those who followed. This style is defined by the author as "flight suit attitude." He writes:
Flight suit attitude ... was a sense of self-confidence and pride that verged on arrogance ... the aircraft of preference was the high-performance, single-seat fighter ... This culture placed a premium on cockiness and informality. A flight suit officer spent more time in a flight suit than in a uniform. In his world, status was based upon flying ability, not degrees, rank, or "officer" skills (p. 6).
Where did this flight suit attitude develop? The author begins by examining the backgrounds of Air Force fighter pilots in this fledgling branch of the United States' military services. In a chapter entitled "An Absence of Ring-Knockers" he looks to a lower percentage of college-educated officers in the Air Force than in the Army or Navy, and particularly to the absence of academy graduates, as a contributing factor to a flight suit attitude. Success in this early Air Force was not based on a fraternity of academy graduates, indoctrinated in a set of shared military values; success was based, rather, on the ability to fly well and on the opportunity to participate in combat in Korea. The author presses home his point by looking at the backgrounds of eleven pilots who flew in Korea, perhaps the best known of whom are Robinson Risner and Earl Brown. Only one pilot whose experiences are described in this book came into the Air Force from West Point; many came from relatively humble backgrounds. Their reminiscences of life in training and combat are spread throughout the book, giving it a personal, anecdotal character.
Pilot training is another factor that the author considers. In a chapter entitled "Stick and Rudder University," Sherwood examines the training given to Air Force pilots in the late 1940s and early 1950s and its contributions to the flight suit attitude. He notes that the majority of Air Force officers during the Korean War were pilots. Indeed, two-thirds of Air Force officers received their commission after completing the Aviation Cadet program, the emphasis of which in was on flying skills. "Ancestry, education, and prior military training or military academy experience had very little to do with one's status in the Air Force ..." (p. 39). The primary concern was how well one could fly an airplane. The result for the Air Force was a more casual junior officer than the usual Army lieutenant or Navy ensign.
In his consideration of the air war over Korea for fighter pilots, the author looks separately at the experiences of those who flew fighter- interceptors and those who flew fighter-bombers. The former group garnered much of the glory. The air combat of F-86 against MiG is the image which springs to mind when one thinks of the Air Force experience in Korea. This image has been reinforced in the public mind through literature and movies. It is maintained within the Air Force as well by such devices as art on the walls of the Pentagon or a Korean War vintage F-86 on a pedestal at the front gate of Nellis AFB. These F-86/MiG engagements were the very essence of the continuing Air Force image of a fighter pilot.
The experiences of the fighter-bomber pilots in Korea were of another sort. Flying somewhat lower-performance aircraft than the F-86, such as the F-80 or F-84, the pilots in fighter-bombers faced a more hazardous day-to-day life from ground fire. Sherwood notes that " ... only 147 Air Force planes were lost in air-to-air combat; by comparison, over 816 planes were shot down by ground fire" (pp 98-99). These pilots were often given less status than the F-86 pilots, who sometimes referred to them derogatorily as "straight wings" in officer clubs. The stress of the hazardous flying also led to a higher incidence of mental illness among fighter-bomber pilots. This dual nature of the fighter pilots' experiences lends an interesting element to the book. The pilots who flew fighter-bombers had no less of a flight suit attitude for their experiences, however.
Throughout this book one also finds ample evidence of the social life of pilots during the Korean War. In a chapter entitled "Thunderboxes and Sabre Dancers" Sherwood looks at such elements of time spent away from the cockpit as bases, the O clubs and day rooms, the R & R opportunities in Japan, and even at female companionship of several very different types. But all seem very secondary to the experiences of flying fighters. Even the rustic conditions at Korean air bases served to remind the pilots that their primary reason for being in Korea was to fly fighter aircraft.
Sherwood concludes his book with a look at the careers of the eleven pilots after the Korean War. All but one remained in the Air Force. Most discovered that the flight suit attitude they embraced early in their flying careers did not always serve them well in the developing bureaucracy ofthe United States Air Force. But most maintained this attitude anyhow, even when a promotion might be lost as a result. Almost inevitably, with few exceptions, they didn't rise above the rank of colonel. It is at that stage of one's career, as one of the pilots noted, where "MiGs start to matter less and power politics take over" (p. 163). But the author concludes that the presence of the pilots who flew fighters in the Korean War contributed much to the shaping of the Air Force.
Interestingly, the obituary of a former Korean War era fighter pilot appeared briefly in recent news, the report neatly reinforcing some of the concepts in Sherwood's book. _U.S. News & World Report_ noted the passing at the age of 70 of one John Boyd, Colonel, USAF, retired. A USAF fighter pilot in Korea and, later, an instructor pilot, Boyd's military influence ranged from the development of doctrines of air combat through the design of planes to his service in the Pentagon, where he and members of a so-called "Fighter Mafia" apparently helped prevail upon the Air Force to build the F-16 and A-10. His influence after his retirement extended to Congress and to people like Dick Cheney, who listened to and learned from Boyd's ideas on historical trends in military success presented in briefings. Boyd seems the epitome of an officer in a flight suit, the type of pilot Sherwood describes so well.
John Sherwood has written an excellent book, combining the military history of USAF fighter operations in the Korean War with the social context of the pilots who flew the fighters. He has contributed much towards a better understanding of the developmental years of the United States Air Force. This book is well worth the reading for anyone with an interest in the Korean War, in the United States Air Force, or in those elusive qualities of character on which larger organizations turn.

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The United States Air Force fought as a truly independent service for the first time during the Korean War. Ruling the skies in many celebrated aerial battles, even against the advanced Soviet MiG-15, American fighter pilots reigned supreme.Yet they also destroyed virtually every major town and city in North Korea, demolished its entire crop irrigation system and killed close to one million civilians.

The self-confidence and willingness to take risks which defined the lives of these men became a trademark of the fighter pilot culture, what author John Darrell Sherwood here refers to as the flight suit attitude. In Officers in Flight Suits, John Darrell Sherwood takes a closer look at the flight suit officer's life by drawing on memoirs, diaries, letters, novels, unit records, and personal papers as well as interviews with over fifty veterans who served in the Air Force in Korea. Tracing their lives from their training to the flight suit culture they developed, the author demonstrates how their unique lifestyle affected their performance in battle and their attitudes toward others, particularly women, in their off-duty activities.


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